



# Toward an Integrated Policy Framework

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G-24 VIRTUAL TECHNICAL GROUP MEETING

FEBRUARY 2021

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# Motivation




- ▶ Textbook approach to external shocks: Allow ER to move freely
- ▶ In practice: Capital flows provide benefits but may generate or amplify shocks
- ▶ Many countries use multiple policy tools after domestic and external shocks
- ▶ Policymakers cite diverse rationales for their approaches
  - ▶ Some rationales may be justified because textbook inflation targeting misses out important real-world imperfections
  - ▶ But some rationales may not be justified
- ▶ These approaches are generally not guided by a **systematic analytical framework**

# Integrated Policy Framework (IPF)



- ▶ Framework to map shocks and country characteristics to the optimal policy mix
  - ▶ Captures interactions between tools
- ▶ Allow for multiple frictions
- ▶ Modeling, empirics, case studies




# Overview of conclusions



- ▶ Optimal policy mix depends on shocks and country characteristics
- ▶ For countries with **no financial frictions**, allowing ER to adjust feely remains optimal
- ▶ Elsewhere:
  - ▶ FXI/CFM/MPMs enhance **monetary autonomy** after external financial shocks
  - ▶ Precautionary CFMs and MPM/CFMs mitigate **financial stability** risks
- ▶ Challenges: **operationalize framework** and develop **safeguards** to prevent misuse

# Financial flows and policy measures



# Adverse shocks in absence of financial frictions



- ▶ In countries with **deep FX markets** and **continuous market access**, full exchange rate flexibility stabilizes output and inflation
  - ▶ Expenditure switching
- ▶ Result holds for all shocks: real and financial, domestic and external
- ▶ Result does not depend on pricing paradigm
- ▶ No need for FXI/CFMs/MPMs

# Countries with currency mismatch and limits on external debt

- ▶ **Precautionary CFMs on unhedged FX debt inflows** reduce sudden stop risk
- ▶ CFMs can help plug **potential gaps in MPM coverage**
- ▶ It is not optimal to impose CFMs to:
  - ▶ Restrict domestic currency debt
  - ▶ Keep the exchange rate persistently undervalued
  - ▶ Shield sectors from foreign competition

# Empirical analysis

- ▶ Evidence on **effectiveness** of tools, not necessarily their optimality
- ▶ Work broadly suggests:
  - ▶ FXI affects the exchange rate, at least in the short run
  - ▶ MPMs and pre-existing CFMs can reduce the domestic buildup of financial vulnerabilities stemming from easy global financial conditions
  - ▶ Evidence on the impact of CFMs on overall capital flows is mixed
  - ▶ Appropriate use of FXI, MPMs, and CFMs may free up monetary policy
  - ▶ Policy combinations are more effective than using a single instrument

# Next steps

- ▶ Fund's policy advice remains guided by the **Institutional View** (IV)
- ▶ Changes to the IV could be considered during its forthcoming review
  - ▶ Key inputs: IPF and Independent Evaluation Office report on the *IMF Advice on Capital Flows*
- ▶ **Analytical work** on the IPF will continue
  - ▶ Develop **metrics** to guide implementation and **safeguards to prevent misuse**
  - ▶ Explore fiscal and multilateral considerations more deeply
  - ▶ Extend analysis of **intertemporal tradeoffs/undesired side effects**
  - ▶ Derive relevant lessons from the COVID-19 crisis



**Thank you!**

# Fiscal and multilateral considerations

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- ▶ **Fiscal stance** and the **level/composition of public debt** affect initial conditions and make some shocks more likely
- ▶ **Fiscal policy** and IPF tools are not good substitutes
  - ▶ IPF tools are better targeted to address financial stability risks and easier to adjust
  - ▶ IPF tools are not a substitute for appropriate fiscal policies or structural reforms
- ▶ **Multilateral dimension:** Coordinated use of IPF tools is likely appropriate after global shocks such as COVID-19
  - ▶ Standard monetary policy and exchange rate flexibility by countries with fewer financial frictions, and mix of IPF tools by those with more frictions
  - ▶ Negative spillovers if flows deflected to countries with frictions or if tools are misused

# Safeguards against inappropriate use

- ▶ In model frameworks, IPF tools are aimed at well-defined macroeconomic and financial stability objectives
- ▶ In practice, there is **risk of misuse** to:
  - ▶ Support misaligned exchange rates
  - ▶ Substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment
  - ▶ Impede competition and price discovery
- ▶ Differentiating between appropriate and inappropriate use of IPF tools will require developing suitable metrics

# Other practical challenges

- ▶ **Shocks** and **country characteristics** can be difficult to identify in real time
- ▶ Need to consider additional **short-term, long-term,** and **spillover** effects
  - ▶ IPF delivers broad principles and helps understand/quantify the tradeoffs
  - ▶ Judgment will be essential in applying the framework
- ▶ **Governance** and **credibility**
  - ▶ Coordination and communication of multiple tools may be difficult
  - ▶ At the same time, a systematic framework can help central banks employing multiple tools to communicate policy decisions and enhance credibility